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FISHERIES TRAFFIC: THE POOR RELATION OF PORT DEVOLUTION. 
LESSONS FROM SPANISH STATE PORTS OF GENERAL INTEREST.1
Abstract:  
The fisheries sector is currently contending with the hectic development of its own 
political economy framework being convulsed by the dynamics of decentralisation. This 
process is enshrouded in an environment of economic globalisation, taking place against 
the backdrop of the governance approach. Taking this situation as our starting point, our 
main goal is to quantify the effects that the Spanish port devolution process might have 
on the Spanish fisheries sector using a transfer function model; we take, as dependent 
variables, both the volumes of landings at State ports of general interest and their cash 
value. 
Keywords: Fisheries Sector, Port Devolution, Governance Approach, Transfer 
Function Model
Introduction
Governance is becoming the dominant focus of marine management, particularly in port 
and fisheries policies. As a type of administration, it is more flexible and includes actors 
from different fields and tiers of government (government agencies, civil society, the 
media, the academic world and businesses) for which new game rules have to be 
devised [1], [2].
As far as ports and harbours are concerned, there has been a profound change in the 
relationship between the State and the ports since the nineteen-eighties. The reasons for 
this include both the globalisation of the economy, resulting in new, wide-ranging and 
more complex traffic and relationships between agencies [3], and the appearance of new 
management models which seek to increase management efficiency and responsiveness, 
with a consequent increase in financial autonomy and profitability. Port devolution is 
the most turned-to proposal in literature addressing the subject from a range of 
perspectives [4], [5]. Devolution is understood here in a broad sense as the transfer of 
responsibility for control, technical and financial organisation and the channel of 
economic activity from the central administration to other institutional agencies closer 
to the port [6], [4].
                                                
1 State Ports of General Interest or National Ports: Act 27/1992, concerning State Ports and the Merchant 
Navy, establishes that ports will be classified as “State Ports of General Interest” on the basis of the 
importance of the role they play in the Spanish port system as a whole (Art. 2.5 and Art. 5). They are 
broad-based commercial traffic ports (including fisheries traffic) under the administrative control of the 
Central Government (exercised through the 'State Ports' public entity). Fishing ports in the strict sense 
which are not considered to be commercial are explicitly excluded from this category according to the 
Act (Art. 3) and are placed under the jurisdiction of regional governments (the Autonomous 
Communities).  
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It must be borne in mind that ‘devolution’ has taken place in all kinds of port systems, 
from Anglo-Saxon [7] to Mediterranean countries [8], with Spain situated in the context 
of the latter. Spanish ports have been defined under the maritime law as public domain 
since the 19th century, although there had also been previous legislative precedents. 
With the passage of time, the State has gradually loosened its control over ports and 
harbours to the point of decentralising both management (Act 27/1992) and political 
control from the central government to regional administrations2 (Act 62/1997, which 
amends the earlier Act3). Both of these initiatives set forth a new distribution of powers 
and responsibilities for port issues: the central administration retains coordination of the 
so-called State ports of general interest, as well as ports with intense commercial traffic 
and broad hinterlands where fisheries traffic and the remaining commercial traffic exist 
side-by-side. All remaining ports, essentially comprising fishing ports, with sparse 
commercial traffic and marinas, are exclusively managed by regional governments [9]. 
This same political and scientific framework has influenced fisheries activity since the 
nineteen-eighties, with one of the most interesting proposals being the ‘governance 
approach’ [10]. Symes [11] understands that, in a similar way to what is happening in 
commercial ports [4], there are three different agendas necessary for the new model to 
be achieved: privatisation, co-governance and regionalisation through, for example, 
decentralization. This is the route that has been followed in Spain, including in fisheries 
policy [12].
Notwithstanding, since the nineteen-eighties, Spanish fisheries policy has been shot 
through with contradictory principles: 'downwards' devolution - in the decentralisation 
direction – has been uneasily combined with a transfer of political power to the 
European Commission, which applies a more top-down approach [13]. Notably, 
participation and devolution - in their respective embodiments of regionalisation and 
decentralisation - do not have a linear relationship; more devolution does not mean 
greater participation of local and regional agencies [14].  
The impacts that these processes have on the different types of traffic and the efficiency 
of port operations are currently under study. Both quantitative models [15], [8], as well 
as more qualitative methodologies are being used both for port policy [16] and for 
fisheries management in keeping with the principles of integrated coastal management 
[17]. 
This article uses quantitative research to analyse the results of the convergence of  port 
economic policy and fisheries models in Spain, with the hypothesis that, in both cases,
we are witnessing a new political-port regime that displays the theory of governance, in 
general, and one of its forms, decentralisation, in particular. Using transfer function 
models, fisheries traffic and the value of the catches at State ports of general interest are 
taken as variables in the analysis.4
Methodology
                                                
2  France and Canada are parallel references [5].
3  See [8] for an analysis of both Acts.
4 The choice of State ports of general interest is justified by their good fisheries statistics. Unlike those for 
regional fishing ports, these statistics are unbroken since 1962, which is essential if the methodology is to 
be applied.
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This approach is a limited version of the model in [8]. Firstly, we used the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with the adjustments proposed by [18] for annual series.5 The aim of this 
is to eliminate spurious effects, whether of a temporal nature, or due to changes in the 
way the variables are historically computed - for example, when adding the value of the 
fresh fish in the markets to catches over the 45 year period considered in the study (from 
1962 to 2006). Secondly, to test the structural break hypothesis, we have chosen to 
estimate transfer function models, in the tradition of [29], although we have extended 
the latter approach to take into account ideas on endogenous-break testing, according to 
[20]. The models considered are:
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where 
)log( FT
tHPTr  denotes the first difference in the trends for the total fresh fish 
traffic logarithm at Spanish State ports of general interest; 
20061993
t  is a dummy variable 
included to account for the effects of the beginning of the Spanish port devolution 
process; 
20061985
t  is a dummy variable included to control for the effects of the entry of 
Spain into the EU (the European Economic Community as was); 
)log(GDP
tHPTr  is the 
first difference in the trends for the Spanish GDP logarithm, under the hypothesis that 
the demand for fresh fish and, therefore, its price, depend on economic development; 
)log(FV
tHPTr  denotes the first difference in the trends for the price per tonne of fresh 
fish logarithm (in constant 2006 euros) in Spanish State  ports of general interest. Figure 
1 presents the values of 
)log( FT
tHPTr ,  
)log(GDP
tHPTr and 
)log( FV
tHPTr .
[FIGURE 1]
We have also included an error term, where j = 3, as well as a constant term ( 0,i

) in 
order to capture the effects of additional variables not directly included in the 
specification. For the dummy variables we have used step formulations (level shift)6. 
These formulations produced the best fit when estimating models (1) and (2).
                                                
5 The scant variability of the series of continuously diminishing Spanish fisheries traffic excludes a filter 
being applied using a non-observable component model, as the result would be a linear trend and a 
constant slope, in other words, the variance of the error term is zero. 
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Results
The estimate of models (1) and (2) by non-linear least squares led to the following 
results (robust standard deviations are shown in brackets):
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)206.0(
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)log(
)730.0()869.2(
)log(
tFTtt
GDP
t
FT
t uHPTrrTHP   
where R2 = 0.97; Durbin Watson = 1.95; LM(1) = 0.87 (p-value).
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where R2 = 0.96; Durbin Watson = 1.84; LM(1) = 0.25 (p-value).
According to (3), the port devolution process that began with Act 27/92 had no effect on 
the development of fisheries traffic at State ports of general interest. However, 
according to (4), it had a negative effect on the economic value of said traffic, 
significant to 99 percent7. An approximation of the measurement of this impact from the 
port devolution process can be obtained from equation (5), in which we compute the 
distance between the estimate of 
)log( FV
tHPTr  given by equation (4), 
)log(ˆ FV
trTHP , and 
the estimate of 
)log( FV
tHPTr  excluding the estimated impact of the reforms,
20061993)log( 242.1ˆ  tFVtrTHP  . Thus we obtain the following port devolution impact 
(hereinafter PDI) measured in percentage growth points:
 
  45.61ˆ
242.1ˆ
2006
1992
)log(
2006
1992
20061993)log(





 
FV
t
t
FV
t
rTHP
rTHP
PDI

             (5)
It can thus be concluded that if this port devolution process had not occurred, the price 
in constant euros would have increased an average of 6.45 times more. 
A significant positive relationship can also be seen between the growth of the GDP and 
the value of fish. Finally, it should be highlighted that Spain's entry into the EEC has 
had no significant effect on the variables being studied.   
Discussion
A number of reasons could explain why the Spanish port devolution process has had no 
positive effect on fisheries traffic at State ports of general interest. Firstly, after 
receiving their autonomy under Act 27/92, these ports directed their management 
                                                
7 In order to prove that the dummy variable that we associate with the date on which the Spanish port 
devolution process began (1st January, 1993) is indeed related to the legal reforms that were enacted on 
those dates, we endogenise the break by shifting it in time. In this way, we control for the fact that it is not 
related to other events that would have happened before or after the Acts. We systematically changed the 
starting year of both events backwards and forwards, up to 1989. In other words, model (2) has been re-
estimated for different start years 
20061993
t from 1987 (before that would be redundant with 20061985t ) 
to 2000. The chosen year, 1983, is the one that maximises the R2 correctness-of-fit statistic and 
minimises Akaike and Schwartz’s information criteria. The results are available from the authors upon 
request.
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towards other types of traffic and port activities which are, a priori, more profitable 
than fishing, such as container traffic and logistics areas. An example of this can be seen 
in the percentage share of investments in the Spanish port system over the last 12 years. 
On average, only 2.94% of investments have been made in fisheries compared to 7.14% 
in logistics activities, for example. The investments made in (the currently over-sized) 
fisheries structures in the past under the developmentalist model [21],8 probably act as a 
curb on the planning of new investments. Perhaps profitability is not the only factor that 
should be taken into account, however. Other traffic, such as container traffic, that 
requires expensive vessels to be constantly at sea, is extremely sensitive to labour 
disputes. The traditional labour disputes in the fisheries sector may have influenced 
these investment decisions.
The alternative logic is the process of locating and concentrating fisheries traffic at 
regional ports specialising in said traffic that are not part of the “general interest” 
network. This phenomenon is occurring both in the process of transfer to regional 
governments (the fishing port of Bonanza ceased to belong to the “general interest” port 
of Seville and became a regional port in the mid nineteen-nineties, for example), and in 
the voluntary transfer of fleets (from the port of Vilagarcía to the regional port of Puebla 
del Caramiñal, for example).
The indifference of Spanish fisheries to institutional variables continues with the lack of 
significance of Spain's entry into the EEC in models (1) and (2). As such, the appraisal 
of the Common Fisheries Policy continues to be controversial [22], beyond any 
bureaucratic issues that might be involved [23] and despite the positive effects on 
particular aspects, such as an improvement in profitability of fishing fleets [24].
Another interesting conclusion that can be drawn from this work is the indirect 
relationship between fresh fish and the evolution of the GDP. At the end of the 
nineteen-eighties, fisheries development stopped responding to the evolution of the 
economic cycle (see panel A in Figure 1). Fishing-ground restrictions meant that the 
foreseeably greater demand for fresh fish, linked to the expansion of the Spanish 
economy, could not be met. This explains the non-significance of  
)log(GDP
tHPTr  in 
model (3). And yet, the inflexibility of the offer faced with variations in demand caused 
by the economic cycle is reflected in the significant positive effect of  
)log(GDP
tHPTr  in 
(4). In short, the variations in fresh fish prices are reflected in economic fluctuations, 
which overreact to these (see panel B in Figure 1).
[FIGURE 1]
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Figure 1. Dependent and independent variables.
Panel A: Percentage change rate of the trend-
cycle component of total fishing traffic of 
Spanish State ports of general interest (left axis) 
and the real GDP (right axis).
Panel B: Percentage change rate of the trend-
cycle component in the price in constant euros 
of one tonne of fresh fish in Spanish State ports 
of general interest (left axis) and the real GDP 
(right axis).
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